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ARTFUL PLEADING DEFEATS HISTORIC
COMMITMENT TO AMERICAN INDIANS
Bethany Henneman*
INTRODUCTION
The United States government has specific commitments to
federally recognized American Indian tribes through treaties,
Congressional Acts, Executive Orders, and Executive Agreements as
well as judicially created commitments.1 One such commitment is the
Department of the Interior’s responsibility to hold American Indian
lands in trust for the benefit of tribes.2 This responsibility requires the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the primary federal agency charged with
carrying out the United States’ trust responsibility to American Indian
people, to manage trust land in a way that best serves American Indian
interests.3
In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians
v. Patchak,4 the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted the Quiet Title
Act (“QTA”)5 in such a way so as to significantly hinder the Secretary
of the Interior’s (“Secretary”) responsibility to carry out the fee-totrust process for American Indian tribes. In Patchak, the Supreme
Court considered: (1) whether the QTA’s reservation of immunity for
actions respecting Indian Trust Lands barred Patchak’s suit and (2)
whether Patchak’s economic, environmental, and aesthetic interests

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law;
B.A., University of California, Berkeley. The author is grateful to her parents, Al and
Suzie Henneman, and her brother, Brooks Henneman, for their unwavering support
and encouragement.
1
Indian Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm
(last updated Mar. 12, 2014, 5:23 PM). “Congress ended treaty–making with Indian
tribes in 1871.” Id.
2
Holt v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 364 F.2d 38, 41 (8th Cir. 1966) (“Tribal land
is held in trust by the United States for the use of the tribe. No individual Indian has
title or an enforceable right in tribal property.”).
3
Indian Affairs, supra note 1.
4
132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
5
28 U.S.C.A. § 2409a (West 1986) [hereinafter QTA].
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were sufficiently within section 465 of the Indian Reorganization
Act’s6 zone of interests as necessary to establish prudential standing.7
The Court found that the QTA’s “Indian Lands Exception”8
barred the type of grievance Patchak advanced and concluded that the
Administrative Procedure Act’s general waiver of sovereign immunity
applied to Patchak’s suit.9 In addition, the Court found that Patchak
had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary’s acquisition of the
Bradley property because Patchak’s land use interests were within the
Indian Reorganization Act’s zone of interests.10
The Supreme Court incorrectly focused on the nature of
Patchak’s action in its determination that the QTA’s Indian Lands
Exception did not apply.11 However, the test for whether the United
States waives sovereign immunity under the QTA should be based on
the relief requested, an “effects test,” instead of the plaintiff’s
grievance.12 In this case, Patchak asked the Court to strip the United
States of title to the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indian’s property. 13 Under the effects test, the QTA
would bar suits by claimants such as Patchak who are not technically
asserting an adverse claim but who are seeking an equally harmful
result through artful pleading to the fee-to-trust process for American
Indian lands. 14 This standard would be consistent with the QTA’s
allowance of suits beyond routine quiet title actions 15 and include
those suits that are impliedly forbidden by the Indian Lands
Exception.16
6

25 U.S.C.A. § 465 (West 1988).
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2203.
8
28 U.S.C.A. § 2409(a) (West 1986). The Indian Lands Exception refers to the
language “[t]his section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands.” Id.
9
Id. at 2208.
10
Id. at 2211.
11
Id. at 2201.
12
Id. at 2214–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
13
Id. at 2204 (majority opinion).
14
Id. at 2215 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
15
An action to quiet title is defined as “a proceeding to establish a plaintiff's title to
land by compelling the adverse claimant to establish a claim or be forever estopped
from asserting it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (9th ed. 2009).
16
Id. at 2216–17.
7

Henneman

146

7/21/2014 2:46 PM

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 14:1

I. THE CASE
In 2001, the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band Of
Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”) petitioned the Department of the
Interior to take the Bradley Property into trust, announcing a plan to
construct and operate a casino on the property in an effort to promote
economic self–sufficiency. 17 In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs announced that it would take the Bradley Property into trust
for the Band pursuant to section Five of the Indian Reorganization Act
(“Reorganization Act”).18 The Federal Register published the decision
with a thirty-day review period before the Secretary of the Interior
(“Secretary”) could carry out the transaction.19
On August 1, 2008, David Patchak filed suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act alleging section 465 of the
Reorganization Act did not authorize the Secretary to acquire property
for the Band because the Band was not a federally recognized tribe
when the Reorganization Act was enacted in 1932. 20 Patchak
requested both a declaration that the decision to acquire the Bradley
Property violated the Reorganization Act and an injunction to stop the

17

Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F.Supp.2d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir. 2009). The Band owned the
land consisting of 147 acres in rural Wayland Township, Michigan. Patchak v.
Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Band petitioned the Department of
the Interior to take the Bradley Property into trust because “if gaming is to occur on
off–reservation lands[,] those lands must be trust lands ‘over which an Indian tribe
exercises governmental power.’” Memorandum from Carl Artman, Assistant Sec’y
U.S. Dep’t of Indian Affairs to the Reg’l Dirs. of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
George Skibine (Jan. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/artman010308.pdf.
18
Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 74. See § 5 of the IRA, which provides: “‘[t]he
Secretary of the Interior is authorized . . . to acquire, through purchase,
relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands . . . within or
without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments . . .
for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C.A. § 465 (West 1988).
19
Patchak, 632 F.3d at 703. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) (2014). During the thirty-day
period, an anti-gambling non-profit organization, MichGo, filed a lawsuit alleging
that the Interior’s approval of the casino violated the National Environmental
Protection Act and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at
75. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the court of
appeals affirmed. Id.
20
Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 75. The Band intervened in the suit to defend the
Secretary’s decision. Patchak, 632 F.3d at 704.
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Secretary from accepting title.21 On October 6, 2008, both the Band
and the United States filed Rule 12 motions seeking judgment in their
favor on the grounds that Patchak lacked prudential standing.22
The district court held Patchak lacked prudential standing to
challenge the Secretary’s acquisition of the Bradley property because
Patchak’s interests did not fall within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by section 465 of the Reorganization Act. 23 The district
court reasoned that Patchak’s requested remedy was likely to frustrate
the objectives of the Reorganization Act, which are to enable selfdetermination, self-government, and self-sufficiency. 24 As a result, the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and granted the
United States motion to dismiss and the Band’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings.25
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and held that
Patchak had prudential standing to bring his claim against the
Secretary.26 The court found the interests of those in the community
surrounding the proposed casino, who would suffer from living near
the proposed casino, were arguably protected interests for parties
attempting to enforce Reorganization Act restrictions. 27 After

21

Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 76. In January 2009, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari for Michigan Gambling Operation v. Kempthorne, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009),
and the Secretary of the Interior took the Bradley Property into trust, mooting
Patchak’s request for an injunction and making the suits sole purpose to divest the
Federal Government of title to the Bradley Property. Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish
Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (2012).
22
Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 76. To establish standing, Patchak contended that he
lived in close proximity to the Bradley Property, and that a casino there would
destroy the lifestyle he enjoyed by causing increased traffic, increased crime,
decreased property values, an irreversible change in the rural character of the area,
and other aesthetic, socioeconomic, and environmental problems. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. at 2203.
23
Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 76.
24
Id. at 77.
25
Id. at 78.
26
Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
27
Id. at 706. The Supreme Court introduced the zone of interests test in recognition
of the “trend . . . toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest
administrative action.” Id. at 705. The zone of interests analysis focuses on “who in
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addressing the standing issue, the court turned to the question of
whether the government consented to Patchak’s suit.28 The court held
Patchak’s claim fell “within the general waiver of sovereign immunity
set forth in section 702 of the APA.”29 The court found that the QTA
did not cover Patchak’s suit because Patchak was not claiming an
ownership interest in the Bradley Property.30 The D.C. Circuit Court’s
holding conflicted with three other United States Circuit Court
decisions, which held that the United States retained immunity from
suits similar to Patchak’s. 31 This circuit split prompted the United
States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to decide the two questions
arising from Patchak’s action: (1) whether the United States had
sovereign immunity from Patchak’s suit by virtue of the QTA, and (2)
whether Patchak had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary’s
acquisition.32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 2012, the QTA underwent a transformation in which the
United States Supreme Court imposed a substantial burden on the
government by opening it up to lawsuits which both Congress and the
Executive Branch thought to be immune from challenge due to the
“national public interest.” 33 Part II.A of this note discusses how
historically, claimants asserting title to land held by the United States
had only limited means of obtaining resolutions for title disputes. 34
Part II.B examines the enactment of the QTA, and specifically how
Congress sought to rectify the difficulty plaintiffs experienced in title
disputes against the United States. 35 Part II.B.1 through Part II.B.2
discuss how the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity was
strictly construed by the Supreme Court, preventing plaintiffs from
practice can be expected to police the interests the statute protects,” not “who
Congress intended to benefit.” Id.
28
Id. at 707.
29
Id. at 712 [hereinafter APA].
30
Id. at 709.
31
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. 2199, 2204 (2012).
32
Id. at 2203.
33
Id. at 2218 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
34
Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280
(1983).
35
Id. at 282.
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avoiding the carefully crafted provisions of the QTA through artful
pleading. Part II.B.3 completes the background analysis by examining
the creation of the effects test used by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals to further interpret the government’s waiver of sovereign
immunity—by allowing suits to be characterized as quiet title actions
based on the relief sought by plaintiffs.
A. Prior to 1972, States and All Others Asserting Title to Land
Claimed by the United States had Limited Means of Obtaining
Resolutions
Without an express congressional waiver, the states and all
other entities are barred from suing the United States by federal
sovereign immunity.36 Prior to the passage of the QTA in 1972, the
United States retained sovereign immunity with respect to suits
involving title to land.37 The result of sovereign immunity was that any
party seeking to assert title to land already claimed by the United
States was left with limited means of enforcing their right; claimants
could attempt to induce the United States to file a quiet title action
against them, or, they could petition Congress or the Executive for
discretionary relief. 38 Claimants also attempted a third means of
asserting their right: by initiating suits against federal officers as a
method of obtaining relief in a title dispute with the federal
government.39
However, in Malone v. Bowdoin, 40 the Supreme Court
announced a rule regarding officer suits stating,
the action of a federal officer affecting property claimed by a
plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief
against the officer as an individual only if the officer's action is
“not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within those

36

Id. at 280 (citing California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 (1979)).
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 281.3
40
369 U.S. 643 (1962).
37
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powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular
case, are constitutionally void.”41
As a result of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Malone,
plaintiffs were left with little recourse to assert and resolve title
disputes with the federal government.42
B. The QTA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Allows Citizens to
Effectively Seek Recourse from the Courts
Subject to certain exceptions, the QTA waives the United
States’ sovereign immunity and permits plaintiffs to name the United
States as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes
involving real property in which the United States claims an interest.43
By passing the QTA, Congress sought to rectify the difficulty
plaintiffs had long experienced when employing a suit to resolve a title
dispute with the United States. 44 The original version of the QTA
stated “[t]he United States may be named a party in any civil action
brought by any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United
States.”45 The Executive Branch opposed the original Senate Bill and
proposed several limits on the waiver of sovereign immunity for the
protection of the public interest.46 One of those limits excluded Indian
lands from the scope of the waiver. The Executive branch argued that
a waiver of immunity with regards to American Indian lands was
inconsistent with existing commitments the government made to the
Indians through treaties and other agreements.47 The final version of
the bill included many of the exceptions proposed by the Executive
Branch, including the Indian Lands Exception.

41

Id. at 647 (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702
(1949)).
42
Block, 461 U.S. at 282.
43
Id. at 275–76.
44
Id. at 282.
45
Id.
46
Block, 461 U.S. at 282–83.
47
Id. at 283.
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1. Early Interpretations of the QTA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands48
illustrates the Supreme Court’s early construal of the QTA with
regards to the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. In Block,
the issue before the court was whether Congress intended the QTA to
provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant could judicially
challenge a United States’ title claim to real property.49 North Dakota
asserted that even if suit was barred by section 2409a(f) of the QTA,
North Dakota’s suit against the federal officers was maintainable
independent of the QTA. 50 The Supreme Court held that Congress
intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse
claimants could challenge the United States' title to real property. 51
Block applied the rule of statutory construction that a precisely drawn,
detailed statute preempts more general remedies.52
In State of Florida, Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 53 the Eleventh Circuit also strictly construed the
QTA to conclude that Congress’ decision to exempt Indian lands from
the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity impliedly forbid the
relief sought by plaintiffs, although technically the plaintiff’s suit was
not a quiet title action.54 The court articulated Congress’ purpose in
enacting the QTA, “to prohibit third parties from interfering with the
responsibility of the United States to hold lands in trust for Indian
Tribes.” 55 Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be anomalous to
allow other claimants, whose interests might be less than that of an
adverse claimant, to divest the government’s title to Indian trust land.56

48

461 U.S. 273 (1983).
Id. at 276–77.
50
Id. at 280.
51
Id. at 286.
52
Id. at 285. “[Section] 702 provides no authority to grant relief when Congress has
dealt in particularity with a claim and has intended a specified remedy to be the
exclusive remedy.” Id. at 286 n.22.
53
768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985).
54
Id. at 1254.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1254–55.
49
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2. Court’s Ensure Plaintiffs are Unable to Avoid the QTA by
Characterizing Suits Under a Different Guise
In United States v. Mottaz, 57 an action was brought to
challenge the government’s sale of three Indian allotments to the
United States Forest Service.58 Plaintiffs sought to avoid the carefully
crafted limitations of the QTA by characterizing their suit as a claim
for allotment under the General Allotment Act of 1887. 59 Applying
Block, the Court concluded that plaintiffs could not use section 345 of
the General Allotment Act for a quiet title action against the
government.60
The Court found that if plaintiffs were permitted to sue under
the General Allotment Act, they might be entitled to actual possession
of the challenged property. 61 Thus, the Court reasoned, permitting
suits against the United States under the General Allotment Act would
allow plaintiffs to avoid the QTA’s twelve–year statute of limitations
and seriously disrupt ongoing federal programs, precisely the threat
the QTA was enacted to avoid. 62 The Court explained that “[t]he
limitations provision of the QTA reflects a clear congressional
judgment that the national public interest requires barring stale
challenges to United States’ claims to real property, whatever the
merits of those challenges.”63
57

476 U.S. 834 (1986).
Id. at 836. Ancestors of respondent Florence Mottaz each received an 80 acre
allotment on the Leech Lake Reservation and Mottaz inherited a one–fifth interest in
one of the allotments and a one-thirtieth interest in each of the other two. Id. United
States held in trust title to all three allotments. Id.
59
Id. at 844. Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, Congress imposed American
real property and inheritance law upon American Indian territories, forcing the
division of tribal land amongst the individual citizens of tribes to be held by the
United States in trust for the individual allottee. G. William Rice, The Indian
Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigeous Peoples, and a
Proposed Carcieri Fix: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L.
REV. 575, 576 (2009).
60
Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 846.
61
Id. at 847. Plaintiff sought a declaration that she alone possessed valid title. Id. at
842. The fact that the plaintiff in Mottaz claimed the right to elect a remedy that
would not require the Government to relinquish its possession of the disputed lands
was irrelevant to the Supreme Court. Id. at 847.
62
Id. at 847.
63
Id. at 851.
58
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3. The Circuit Courts Create an Effects Test, Characterizing Suits as
Quiet Title Actions Based on the Relief Sought by Plaintiffs
After United States v. Mottaz,64 it was evident that the QTA’s
limitation on suits should not be circumvented through artful
pleading. 65 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, the circuit courts
focused their attention on how a plaintiff’s suit would impact the
United States’ title to Indian trust land rather than focusing on the type
of property interest a plaintiff asserted in their complaint.66
In Metropolitan Water District of South California v. United
States, the plaintiffs argued that the QTA did not apply to their suit
because the Metropolitan Water District was not seeking to quiet title
but instead seeking a determination of the boundaries of an Indian
Reservation.68 However, the Ninth Circuit held in favor of the United
States, stating that although plaintiffs sought a determination of the
boundaries of the reservation, the effect of a successful challenge
would be to quiet title in others than the Tribe.69 The court stated that
to allow this suit would be to permit third parties to interfere with the
government’s discharge of its responsibilities to Indian tribes with
respect to the lands it holds in trust for them. The court concluded that
third parties are not permitted to interfere when the Secretary claims
an interest in real property based upon that property’s status as trust or
restricted Indian land.70
67

Additionally, the Tenth Circuit used an effects test in
Neighbors for Rationale Development, Inc. v. Norton. 71 Neighbors
argued that the QTA was inapplicable to its case because the plaintiffs
64

476 U.S. 834 (1986).
Neighbors for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956, 965 (2004), abrogated
by Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S.
Ct. 2199 (2012).
66
Id.
67
830 F.2d 139 (1987), abrogated by Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
68
Metro. Water Dist. of S. California, 830 F.2d at 143.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 144.
71
379 F.3d 956 (2004).
65
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were not adverse claimants seeking to quiet title in the Indian school
property and did not claim an ownership interest in the property.72 The
court held that the QTA precluded Neighbor’s suit to the extent it
sought to nullify the Secretary’s trust acquisition.73 The court stated
“[i]t is well settled law that the QTA’s prohibition of suits challenging
the United States’ title to Indian trust lands may prevent suit even
when a plaintiff does not characterize its action as a quiet title
action.”74 The court reasoned that if Congress was unwilling to allow a
plaintiff claiming title to land to challenge the United States’ title to
trust land, it was highly unlikely Congress intended to allow plaintiffs
with no claimed property rights to challenge the same title to trust
land.75
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians
v. Patchak, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the D.C.
Circuit, holding that the QTA’s reservation of sovereign immunity did
not bar Patchak’s suit nor did the doctrine of prudential standing. 76
The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.77
The Supreme Court’s first task involved determining whether
the United States retained sovereign immunity from Patchak’s suit.78
To get to this question, the Supreme Court first looked at section 702
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which generally waives
the government’s sovereign immunity for claimants seeking “relief
other than monetary damages” and stating “a claim that an agency or
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official

72

Id. at 961.
Id. at 965.
74
Neighbors for Rationale Dev., Inc., 379 F.3d at 961. See also Martin M. Heit,
Annotation, Real Property Quiet–Title Actions against United States under Quiet
Title Act, 60 A.L.R. FED. 645 (1982) (“Quiet Title Act’s prohibition of suits
challenging the United States’ title in Indian trust land may prevent suit even when a
plaintiff does not characterize its action as a quiet title action.”).
75
Neighbors for Rationale Dev., Inc., 379 F.3d at 962.
76
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2212.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 2203.
73
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capacity or under color of legal authority.” 79 The Court’s opinion
noted that the APA’s general waiver does not apply “if any other
statute granting consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief
which is sought.”80 Therefore, the Court considered both the Band and
Secretary’s contention that the QTA expressly forbid the relief sought
by Patchak.81
The QTA includes its own waiver of sovereign immunity,
which authorizes suits against the government to adjudicate disputed
titles to real property in which the United States claims an interest.82
However, the QTA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply “to
trust or restricted Indian lands.”83 The Court, using language in a letter
written by Justice Scalia during his time in the Office of the Attorney
General,84 stated that the Indian Lands Exception did not render the
government immune from suit because the QTA addresses only quiet
title actions which were different than the grievance advanced by
Patchak.85 According to the majority, the QTA speaks only to quiet
title actions, which are “universally understood to refer to suits in
which a plaintiff not only challenges someone else’s claim, but also
asserts his own right to disputed property.”86 The Court ruled that the
Indian Lands Exception did not apply because Patchak was not
asserting his own claim to the land, and thus his suit was
distinguishable from a quiet title action. In reaching its decision, the
Court differentiated Patchak’s case from two prior cases where the
QTA was used to address suits in which the plaintiff asserted an
ownership interest in property held by the government. 87 The court

79

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
Id.
81
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2205.
82
Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2006).
83
Id.
84
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2205.
85
Id. Patchak did not claim any competing interest in the Bradley Property. Id. at
2206.
86
Id. The Court strengthened its argument by noting that the other provisions of the
QTA made clear that the term quiet title action carried its ordinary meaning under
the statute. Id.
87
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2208.
80
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concluded that Patchak’s suit was a “garden variety” APA claim and
that the APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity applied.88
Next, the Court considered the alternative argument that
Patchak lacked prudential standing. 89 The Band and Government
argued that Patchak’s injuries were not within section 465’s zone of
interests because the Reorganization Act focuses on land acquisition
whereas Patchak’s interests were based on land use.90 The Court noted
that land forms the basis for Tribal economic life and that section 465
is the primary mechanism to foster the economic development of
Indian Tribes.91 In turn, under section 465, the Secretary takes title to
properties in trust if “the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self–
determination, economic development, or Indian housing.” 92 In the
Court’s opinion, the Department of the Interior’s policy reflected the
Reorganization Act’s dependence on the projected use of the
property.93 Therefore, according to the Court, the decision to acquire
the Bradley Property for gaming purposes under section 465 involved
questions of land use.94 The Court concluded that Patchak’s economic,
environmental, and aesthetic interests in land use fell within the zone
of interests protected by the Reorganization Act.95
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion
was inconsistent with both the QTA and the APA.96 Justice Sotomayor
reasoned that as a result of the opinion, any person could sue under the
APA “to divest the Federal Government of title to and possession of
land held in trust for Indian tribes, relief expressly forbidden by the
QTA, so long as the complaint does not assert a personal interest in the
land.”97

88

Id. at 2208.
Id. at 2210. The Court applied its prudential standing test: a person suing under the
APA must satisfy Article III standing requirements and the interest asserted must be
“arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated” by the IRA. Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 2211.
92
25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(3) (2013).
93
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2211.
94
Id. at 2211–12.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 2212. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
97
Id.
89
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The dissent laid out Congress’ intent in enacting the QTA,
which was to provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of
real–property disputes between private parties and the United States.98
Justice Sotomayor contended that the expansive provision in section
2409(a) of the QTA was limited, through the Indian Lands Exception,
because the application of a waiver of immunity in regards to trust or
restricted Indian Lands would frustrate earlier commitments the
government had made to Indian Tribes.99 Next, in regards to the QTA,
she argued that the Indian Lands Exception was essential because it
guaranteed that the United States could not be stripped of possession
of property in trust for Indian Tribes without giving consent. 100
Finally, Justice Sotomayor asserted that Congress’ restriction on the
class of claimants entitled to relief impliedly forbade relief for the
remainder. 101 Therefore, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the QTA
expressly precluded the relief Patchak sought, to divest the Federal
Government of title to Indian trust land.102
Turning to section 702 of the APA, which focuses on whether
another statute explicitly or impliedly forbids the relief a claimant
seeks, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the relief Patchak sought, to
oust the Government of title to Indian trust land, was identical to the
relief forbidden by the QTA. 103 She noted that it was highly
implausible that Congress intended to retain the government’s
sovereign immunity against those asserting a constitutional real
property interest while waiving the government’s sovereign immunity
against those who assert an aesthetic interest in land use. 104
Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority by pointing out
that the QTA allows suits beyond quiet title actions including suits by
98

Id. Justice Sotomayor quoted section 2409(a) of the QTA which reads, “[t]he
United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section
to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an
interest.” Id.
99
Id. at 2213.
100
Id.
101
Id. In this case, judicial review of those without a “right, title, or interest” may be
impliedly precluded because their interest is insufficient to warrant abrogation of the
government’s sovereign immunity. Id.
102
Id. at 2214.
103
Id. at 2214–15.
104
Id. at 2215.
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claimants with easements, mineral rights, or some other lesser “right”
or “interest.”105 In addition, she noted, even if the QTA only expressly
forbid quiet title actions, Patchak’s suit would still be impliedly
forbidden.106
Finally, Justice Sotomayor identified three consequences
derivative from the majority’s opinion which Congress could not have
intended when it enacted the QTA: (1) the QTA’s limitations are
easily circumvented; (2), the Government’s ability to resolve realproperty challenges expeditiously is frustrated; and (3), the creation of
substantial uncertainty regarding which claimants are barred from
bringing APA claims. 107 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the
government should have retained sovereign immunity from Patchak’s
suit because the QTA’s Indian Lands Exception barred the relief
Patchak sought.108 The dissenting opinion never reached the question
of prudential standing.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians
v. Patchak, the United States Supreme Court held that the Indian
Lands Exception to the QTA did not address the type of grievance
Patchak advanced because Patchak was not an adverse claimant. 109
Based on this determination, the Court concluded that the APA’s
general waiver of sovereign immunity applied to Patchak’s suit.110 The
Court’s focus on the nature of Patchak’s action—injuries related to the
use of the Bradley Property as a casino111—was an unlikely result in
light of the Court’s earlier interpretations of the QTA in Block112 and

105

Id. at 2216.
Id. at 2216–17.
107
Id. at 2217.
108
Id. at 2218.
109
Id. at 2207.
110
Id. at 2210.
111
Id. at 2203.
112
See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 277 (1983) (holding “that the QTA
forecloses the other bases for relief urged by the State, and that the limitations
provision is as fully applicable to North Dakota as it is to all
others who sue under the QTA”).
106
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Mottaz. 113 The Court’s holding allows plaintiffs to oust the
government of title to Indian land through an APA action, nullifying
the Indian Lands Exception to the QTA. Instead of focusing on the
nature of Patchak’s action the Court should have focused on the effect
of a successful challenge. This relief–focused approach would
safeguard the United States’ sovereign immunity from suits like
Patchak’s seeking to dispossess the government of Indian trust land.
A. Allowing Patchak to Avoid the Carefully Crafted Provisions of the
Quiet Title Act was an Improbable Result After Block and Mottaz
In Patchak, the Supreme Court strayed from its strict
observance of the conditions Congress attached to the QTA as seen in
Block and Mottaz, rendering futile the government’s time-honored
commitment to tribal self–sufficiency. The Supreme Court permitted
Patchak to circumvent the QTA’s Indian Lands Exception by filing an
action under the APA because it found Patchak was not an adverse
claimant. 114 The determination that Patchak was not an adverse
claimant was important to the principle of stare decisis because in
Block the Supreme Court held that “Congress intended the QTA to
provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could
challenge the United States' title to real property.”115
The APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity was not
intended to be the new supplemental remedy for plaintiffs involved in
land use disputes with the United States government.116 Enacted only
four years after the QTA, the APA specifically withholds authority to
grant relief if “any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” 117 The Court in Block
recognized that if a plaintiff could use an APA action to divest the
government of title to Indian trust land, “all of the carefully crafted
113

See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 836 (1986) (holding “that
respondent’s suit is an action ‘to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which
the United States claims an interest’ within the meaning of the Quiet Title Act of
1972”).
114
Id. at 2207.
115
Block, 461 U.S. at 286.
116
Id. at 286 n.22.
117
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).

Henneman

160

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

7/21/2014 2:46 PM

[VOL. 14:1

provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the
national public interest could be averted … [and] the Indian lands
exception to the QTA would be rendered nugatory.”118 Twenty–nine
years later, the Court did just that, allowing Patchak to bring suit
against the Secretary to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in
which the United States claimed an interest.
Although the majority in Patchak did not specifically overturn
the opinion of Block, the Patchak decision did not adequately
distinguish the two cases. The grievance Patchak asserted was no
different from the plaintiffs in Block who attempted to avoid the
QTA’s restrictions by bringing an officer’s suit, seeking relief because
agency officials acted outside of their federal power. 119 Patchak
similarly claimed that the Secretary lacked authority under section 465
to take title to the Bradley property, but distinguished the suit from
Block by claiming economic, environmental, and aesthetic harm would
ensue from the casino's operation.120
However, in Block, the Court was not “detained long by North
Dakota's contention that it [could] avoid the QTA's statute of
limitations and other restrictions by the device of an officer's suit.”121
The Court rejected the officer’s suit stating, “[i]t would require the
suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its
careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful
pleading.” 122 In contrast, the Patchak Court declined to follow the
reasoning in Block, and instead narrowly defined adverse claimant as
“plaintiffs who themselves assert a claim to property antagonistic to
the Federal Government's.” 123 Essentially, the Supreme Court
distinguished Patchak and North Dakota’s suits based on the
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaints.124

118

Block, 461 U.S. at 284–85.
Id. at 278 n.3.
120
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish- Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct.
2199, 2202–03 (2012).
121
Block, 461 U.S. at 284.
122
Id. at 285 (quoting Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976)).
123
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2207.
124
Id.
119
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The Supreme Court inadequately distinguished the claims
because both plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, directing the United
States to cease and desist from exercising ownership over the land in
question. As stated by the majority in Patchak, “[a]ll parties agree that
the suit now effectively seeks to divest the Federal Government of title
to the [Indian trust] land.” 125 This type of relief was specifically
addressed in United States v. Mottaz as relief forbidden under the
QTA; “[s]ection 2409a(a) … [ ] operates solely to retain the United
States’ immunity from suit by third parties challenging the United
States’ title to land held in trust for Indians.” 126 Therefore, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak was an unlikely result of the
decisions in Block and Mottaz.
B. The Supreme Court Erred by Focusing on the
Nature of Patchak’s Action
Patchak was able to circumvent the Indian Lands Exception
through artful pleading, which is now likely to be the favored strategy
for plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in
which the United States claims an interest. In order to avoid the QTA,
Patchak merely categorized his suit as aesthetic, a suit not to contend
his ownership of the Bradley property, but instead to strip the United
States of title to Indian trust land based on economic, environmental,
and aesthetic harms. 127 Allowing plaintiffs to use a garden variety
APA claim to challenge a decision by the Secretary to take Indian land
into trust adversely implicates the Indian Lands Exception by opening
up the Courts to non–adverse claimants like Patchak, who have the
most remote injuries and indirect interests in the land.128
The Supreme Court’s focus on the nature of Patchak’s action
will open the floodgates to litigation based on a small misidentification
of the QTA’s operative language. The Supreme Court incorrectly
defined the QTA to authorize a particular type of action; “a suit by a
plaintiff asserting a ‘right, title, or interest’ in real property that

125

Id. at 2204.
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 842 (1986).
127
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2207.
128
Id. at 2209.
126
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conflicts with a ‘right, title, or interest’ the United States claims.”129
However, that language comes from 28 U.S.C. section 2409a(d),
which merely states the parameters for a complaint under the QTA.130
The Supreme Court should have focused on the QTA’s
operative language in 28 U.S.C. section 2409a(a), which reads: “[t]he
United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action
under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in
which the United States claims an interest . . . [t]his section does not
apply to trust or restricted Indian lands.”131 Section 2409a(a) reflects
Congress’s intent that the United States’ real property interest define a
QTA action, not the plaintiff’s interest. Based on the language of
section 2409a(a), the United States should retain full immunity from
suits seeking to challenge its title to Indian trust land. Patchak’s suit
contests the government’s title to the Bradley property held in trust for
the Band, and therefore, should have been barred by the government’s
sovereign immunity with respect to Indian trust lands under the QTA.
The majority opinion will severely hinder the judicial system
and the executive branch because until the Patchak decision, parties
seeking to challenge agency action had only a thirty–day review
period to seek judicial review. 132 APA claims, however, generally
have a six–year statute of limitations, which will hinder all American
Indian Tribe’s ability to develop land until the APA’s six–year statute
of limitations has lapsed. 133 This result cannot be squared with the
129

Id. at 2205. This narrow definition essentially limits quiet title actions to “suits in
which a plaintiff not only challenges someone else’s claim, but also asserts his own
right to disputed property.” Id. at 2206.
130
See Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d) (1986) (stating “[t]he complaint shall
set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff
claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the
right, title, or interest claimed by the United States.”).
131
Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (1986). This clause has been interpreted to
mean that “[w]hen the United States claims an interest in real property based on that
property’s status as trust or restricted Indian lands, the Quiet Title Act does not
waive the government's immunity.” 65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title § 86 (2013). See
also Martin M. Heit, , supra note 77, at 645 (“With regard to the Quiet Title Act
Indian lands exception generally, as long as the United States has a colorable claim
to a property interest based on that property's status as trust or restricted Indian
lands, the QTA renders the government immune from suit.”).
132
25 C.F.R. § 151.12 (2011).
133
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2217. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Department of the Interior’s investment in the economic development
of Tribes and will severely impede the Secretary from acquiring
properties “for the purpose of providing land [to the] Indians.”134
C. The Supreme Court Should Have Created a Relief–Centered
Approach to Determine Whether an Action Falls Under the QTA
The proper test for whether the QTA applies is an effects test
based on the relief requested by the plaintiff. Any suit seeking to
divest the government of title to Indian trust land would be barred by
the Indian Lands Exception to the QTA. This test would apply to suits
for purposes other than to quiet title, prohibiting third parties from
interfering with the responsibility of the United States to hold land in
trust for Indian tribes.
An effects test was effective when applied in the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. In State of Florida, Dep't of Bus. Regulation
v. United States Dep't of Interior, the Eleventh Circuit found
Congress’ decision to exempt Indian lands from the waiver of
sovereign immunity impliedly forbid the relief sought by the
plaintiffs. 135 Because the result of a successful suit would have
interfered with the trust relationship between the Tribe and the
government, the court lacked jurisdiction; the lawsuit was barred by
United States sovereign immunity.136
The effects test, or relief–centered approach, is consistent with
the solemn commitments between American Indian Tribes and the
United States Government in regards to Indian trust lands. As stated in
a Senate Report regarding the QTA;
“[t]he Federal Government has over the years made specific
commitments to the Indian people through written treaties and
through informal and formal agreements. The Indians, for their
part, have often surrendered claims to vast tracts of land.
President Nixon has pledged his administration against
134

25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988).
768 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1985).
136
Id. at 1257.
135
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abridging the historic relationship between the Federal
Government and the Indians without the consent of the
Indians.”137
An effects test would effectively safeguard the historic relationship
between the federal government and American Indians by keeping the
government from being subject to burdensome, expensive litigation,
potentially resulting in unjust loss of federal trust properties.138
This relief–centered approach is also consistent with the
language of the APA. The APA's general waiver of the federal
government's immunity from suit does not apply “if any other statute
that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief
which is sought” by the plaintiff. 139 The APA focuses on the relief
which is sought. This is consistent with the QTA, which focuses on
suits where the relief sought by the plaintiff would challenge the
United States interest in real property. In addition, using an effects test
would allow for uniformity among similar suits. In Patchak, Block,
and Mottaz, the effect of a successful challenge was to divest the
United States of title to Indian trust land. Under the effects test, all
three suits would be barred by United States sovereign immunity. In
conclusion, the Supreme Court’s focus on the nature of Patchak’s
action was incorrect; when a plaintiff’s suit has the effect of
dispossessing the government of Indian trust land, the Indian Lands
Exception to the QTA should apply.
V. CONCLUSION
In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians
v. Patchak, Patchak’s artful characterization of his suit permitted the
Court to strip the United States of title to the Bradley Property, relief
expressly and impliedly forbidden by the QTA.140 The Supreme Court
should have focused on the effect of a successful challenge to the
Secretary of the Interior’s actions, which was to divest the federal
government of title to Indian trust land.141 Instead, the Court allowed
137

S. REP. NO. 92–575, at 4 (1971).
Id.
139
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
140
See supra Part IV.A.
141
See supra Part IV.C.
138
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Patchak to avoid the carefully crafted provisions of the QTA deemed
necessary for the protection of the national public interest and interests
of American Indian Tribes.142

142

See supra Part IV.B.

